Rustle your bag. Anxiously. The rest is pragmatics

 

Title: Pragmatics
Author: George Yule
Series Editor: H. G. Widdowson
Publisher: Oxford University Press
Year: 1996

 

 

 

 

 

I’m quite sure I have never recommended books before on this blog. If anything, since many reviews are critical and often nit-picking, it wouldn’t be altogether unusual if one was used to leaving this blog with nothing but my haughty opinions. Which is nice, right? We love it! What? No.

So here’s a book I thoroughly recommend. I think one should choose to read this if a) interested in pragmatics, b) interested in cool things to speak about at linguists’ cocktail parties, c) interested in discourse analysis or d) particularly bewitched by the beauty of the array that human language his. (Although my tone is insincerely portentous, the claims are genuine). Oxford’s “Introductions to Language Study” are lightly-written prolegomena touching upon subjects such as: semantics, syntax, pragmatics, historical/applied linguistics, phonetics and many others. George Yule’s Pragmatics is, although I’m sure the title might have misguided some very few, the one interested in pragmatics. Its nine chapters cover the big-time subjects of pragmatics (speech-acts, deixis, implicature, politeness etc.) in an accessible design where, for instance, every newly introduced concept is explained and no footnotes are inserted.

Let us say a few words.

The four things pragmatics is about are summed-up as (1) the study of meaning as communicated by speakers, (2) the study of contextual meaning (how does the context influence what is conveyed), (3) the study of what is communicated yet unsaid, (4) the study of distance (i.e. amount of shared experience between speakers). That is why, among kindred subjects, pragmatics is said to dwell upon the relation between form & user, whereas semantics would insist upon the relation between form & world (roughly, how do words reflect reality).

Deictic expressions (“pointing via language”, e.g. ‘now’, ‘then’, ‘you’, ‘this’ etc.), their usage and interpretation, are briefly analyzed. The gist of speech-act theory (analysis, classification, identification) and implicatures (conventional[1], conversational, generalized conversaional) are examined and exemplified. The twin-concepts presupposition & entailment are also briefly introduced. I have no other introduction in Pragmatics to compare with, but I will say this: the chapter on potential presuppositions is probably the most instructive, the one dealing with reference and inference – the least. (In fact, since all-year-round we will deal with specific topics in argumentation theory, I am going to try and write post on reference sometime this week. Reading George Yule’s chapter is nevertheless a good, albeit restricted, starting point).

Politeness is a theme I had not been meticulously acquainted with until reading this. I think it’s a fruitful subject from which one can draw explanations for some phenomena relating to humor: over-politeness, for instance, is undoubtedly a species of irony. Also, it explains instances of odd sequences such as this,

A: Do you mind if I use your phone? B: Yeah, sure,

where the literal meaning of the response would actually be “No.” It can also have some sort of practical usefulness for those who have problems borrowing pencils: 

Needless to say, you can find a PDF copy of the book in every nook and cranny of this wild, copyright-devouring thing called Internet. Enjoy. And if you do, you must continue with this. I’m just saying.

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[1] One should probably look here for more recent insights on conventional implicatures.

Illustrations

First, an example of how deictic expressions (“this”, “that”, “now”, “then”, “you”, “me”… “tomorrow”) are nonsensical if one cannot identify the context of them being made. Whenever, as a customer, we read this ad, we are constrained to understand the referent of “tomorrow” as “the day after you read this ad” therefore never ever(-ever) getting any free beer. Same would apply, for example, to an announcement “Back in 1 hour” written on a closed door.

 

This nonsense could be then used (even more clearly than above) to produce irony. If above one could identify the “ignorant speaker” making “ignorant, derisory claims” for the “sensible audience” that “sees through his intention”, below one could also identify some sort of previous act of announcing being echoed.

Technorati Tags: pragmatics,deictic expressions,interpretation,meaning

 

PS: Why is my capitalized ‘i’ smaller than my non-capitalized “l”?

To each his own. How do we theorize on that?

[Kock, Christian (2008). Is Practical Reasoning Presumptive?. Informal Logic, 27(1). Retrieved August 27, 2010, from http://ojs.uwindsor.ca/ojs/leddy/index.php/informal_logic/article/view/466/435]

A rather short version of this post could be “No, it’s not”, but something tells me I should elaborate. First, let’s see we’ve got our concepts clear. A slightly undeveloped definition of “practical reasoning” would stress that it is a type of goal-directed reasoning which points towards an action. How should argumentation theorists understand this ‘pointing’ attribute and what does the inferential process contain, these questions make up the subject of Christian Kock’s (University of Copenhagen) article. The high-principled, feed-reading part of this blog’s audience should already be familiar with the concept of presumptive reasoning, at least in the specific form it appears in Douglas Walton’s pragmatic theory[1].

Walton treats practical reasoning as a species (or a specific scheme within the larger category) of presumptive reasoning. For example, “If A is brought about, then good (bad) consequences will occur. Therefore, A should (not) be brought about” (Walton, 1995, p. 155). In direct opposition, Kock argues that “for practical reasoning the presumptive model is misleading.” (p. 93).

Kock dwells quite convincingly on the fact that practical reasoning ‘points’ not towards what ought to be done, or what is prudent for an agent to do, but towards proposals. This may seem like a trivial point (a proposal, after all, is something which the arguer thinks of as more or less imperative, given that such and such goals are common between her and the hearer). However, the distinctive feature of proposals vis-à-vis propositions is that “proposals do not have truth-values” and “instead, they have a large range of properties” (p. 94, emphasis in the original). So this, in Kock’s view, is what practical reasoning points to[2]: proposals. The next question is how practical reasoning functions (if not presumptively)?

 

In a nutshell, Kock advocates for viewing practical reasoning/argumentation which might be legitimately named conductive. This means that: a) there may be reasonable arguments on both sides of the proposal – since several, different goals & values can be of some importance at the same time, b) the strength of practical reasoning is “non-binary, that is, gradualistic (‘scalar’) notion” (102), and c) the evaluation is highly subjective - this subjectivity not being necessarily of a relativistic, unreasonable kind. Argumentation theory, the author suggests, should recognize this relativity as legitimate, instead of banning it out of what makes an ideal of reasonableness.

If this is the point to be made, then looking back to this passage, it may actually draw attention upon a sort of stiffness even the more revolutionary, state-of-the-art theories are prone to:

Inference models of argumentation and argument evaluation (whether deductive, inductive, presumptive or otherwise) may be likened to an electrical circuit. In deductive inference, validity turns the switch on, and it stays on; if validity is absent, the switch is off and stays off. In non-monotonic inference, there is a toggle switch which can turn the inference on and off again. In the presumptive inference model the toggle switch turns a presumption of the inference on and off while at the same time shifting the burden of proof back and forth. In all inference models, a given argument is evaluated in terms of whether it turns the inference on or not, and the switch only has two positions: on and off. This is tantamount to saying that when you accept an argument in such a model, you are bound to accept the conclusion. There is a two-way bind between argument and conclusion, even when, as in presumption, it is possible to become unbound again. (p. 95)

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[1] “Deductive and inductive reasoning is to be distinguished from presumptive reasoning by the nature of the link between the premises and the conclusion, as used in an argument, and by the nature of the warrant, or linking (general) premise that connects the premises to the conclusion. In a deductively valid argument, if the premises are true, then the conclusion must be true, in every case. In an inductively strong argument, if the premises are (probably) true, then the conclusion can be evaluated as likely to be true, with a certain degree of probability. Both of these types of arguments can be judged for validity (or conditional probability in the case of inductive arguments) by means of a calculus that can be applied to the argument independently of the context of dialogue surrounding it. Presumptive reasoning is evaluated, in contrast, by its use in a context of dialogue where two parties are reasoning with each other. A presumptive argument is judged by whether it shifts a weight of presumption to the side of the other party in a dialogue. Presumptive reasoning is always tentative or provisional in nature.” (Walton, 1995, p. 132)

[2] By the way, the author doesn’t make use of this verb (‘pointing’) when referring to the inferential process, and thus I do not guarantee that it reflects the mental act properly. For there’s more to practical reasoning than just ‘pointing’ (i.e. drawing attention towards). More accurate expressions could be ‘give weight to’ or ‘strengthen’.

Technorati Tags: Informal Logic,Douglas Walton,Christian Kock,argumentation theory,argumentation schemes,presumptive reasoning,practical reasoning,values,goals,inference

Ad bacculum – the archetype

 

So there you have it. Wrestling cannot possibly be fake. Not for the poor news reporter at least. Too bad the video itself is fake. Not less of an example of ad baculum, though.

Who’s who: ignoratio elenchi vs. red herring

 

Walton, D. (2010). Why Fallacies Appear to be Better Arguments Than They Are. Informal Logic, 30(2). Retrieved August 23, 2010, from http://ojs.uwindsor.ca/ojs/leddy/index.php/informal_logic/article/view/2868/2408

First of all,

Yeah… marching on.

Fallacies of irrelevance are probably the most cited ones in folk Informal Logic. By “cited” and “folk” I mean every time two people are arguing about something and, at some stickling point, the discussion turns from the actual subject to itself. At that point, utterances such as the following occur: “What’s that got to do with everything?”, “That’s beside the point!”, “That’s not important”, “Don’t change the subject!” etc.

Being irrelevant, nevertheless, is a broad accusation with which theorists will not be content. The problem is not only one of classification, but also (the more pressing one of) identification, evaluation and criticism. Two of the major fallacies of irrelevance, wrong conclusion and red herring, are being distinguished in this article.

Let us first cite the examples:

• (1) In a law court, in attempting to prove that the accused is guilty of murder, the prosecution may argue at length that murder is a horrible crime. He may even succeed in proving that conclusion. But when he infers from his remarks about the horribleness of murder that the defendant is guilty of it, he is committing the fallacy of ignoratio elenchi. (73)
• (2) Professor Conway complains of inadequate parking on our campus. But did you know that last year Conway carried on a torrid love affair with a member of the English department? The two used to meet every day for clandestine sex in the copier room. Apparently they didn't realize how much you can see through that fogged glass window. Even the students got an eyeful. Enough said about Conway. (75)

Right off the bat, one could easily notice in both examples something fishy about relevance. While in (1) the general horribleness of homicide has little to do with the defendant’s guiltiness, in (2) to say Professor Conway’s “torrid” love-making is irrelevant to the adequacy of parking spots is an utter British understatement. Since both instances of argumentation lead away from the issue (purportedly) being discussed, Douglas Walton duly underlines this resemblance between the two, to the point “one might wonder what the difference is supposed to be between the wrong conclusion fallacy and the red herring fallacy.” (77) How is this to be resolved?

…there is a difference that might be cited. The wrong conclusion fallacy seems more like a bad shot, a blunder, or error of reasoning. Something is hit, but it is the wrong conclusion. The red herring seems more like a deliberate deception of the listener by the arguer by bringing in some controversial issue (79)

Cases of the Wrong Conclusion Fallacy (1) There' has to be a proposition identified as the wrong conclusion. (2) The given argument has to throw probative weight onto that wrong conclusion. (3) The given argumentation leading to the wrong conclusion has to throw no probative weight onto the conclusion to be proved. (4) There has to be a lack of sufficient evidence of a strategic diversion.

Cases of the Red Herring Fallacy (1) There has to be no proposition that can be specified as the wrongconclusion. (2) There has to be sufficient evidence of the existence of a strategic diversion. (3) The interlude in the strategic diversion has to throw no probative weight on the conclusion to be proved.

 

This should do. Furthermore, for borderline cases, one can make things easier by stipulating some additional rules, such as

(HWC) If the argumentation has definitely arrived at a wrong conclusion, classify it as wrong conclusion.

(HRH) If there is some doubt about whether the argumentation has arrived at a definitely wrong conclusion, and if there is strong evidence of strategic diversion, classify it as red herring.

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It might be that is to early in the morning for the part of my brain that undertakes reviewing, but I cannot see how the third point from the “Red Herring Fallacy” is even possible as a pragmatic phenomenon. If the interlude is an instance of argumentation, how can it not throw probative weight (however little) on any conclusion whatever? Walton writes, “the difference is that in the wrong conclusion type of case, something is proved, whereas in the red herring type of case, the interlude may provide a mass of argumentation of some sort, but this mass is not used to prove anything.” (90, my emphasis). And in another place, “its capability to throw probative weight onto the conclusion to be proved, or any proposition that may be different from it but looks similar to it, or close to it, is null.” (92) This is allegedly one of the main difference between a WrongC and a RedH: the former proves something wrong, the latter proves nothing but distracts attentntion. But if one chunk of text is an instance of argumentation, how could it not prove anything. And if it is not an instance of argumentation, then it could simply be an interlude and then the discussion could be resumed; if this is so, then the analysis of that interlude is unprofitable if what we follow is the argumentative moves of one party. But if it is argumentation, it cannot be thus but by throwing at least some weight onto some conclusion, which, caeteris paribus, makes it the RedH a case of WrongC.

 

Technorati Tags: Douglas Walton,fallacy,fallacies,wrong conclusion,red herring,ignoratio elenchi,fallaciousness,reasoning,argumentation

Introducing the parascheme. And trying for an explanation.

Yes, it has been a long time. Stuff happened. But I’m back, let us proceed. In order for me to shape up, I’ll start with smaller posts in which I’ll review one or two articles instead of whole books. You will surely notice a penchant for texts written by or related to Douglas Walton’s work in argumentation theory. Douglas Walton’s articles are easily (and freely) available here and here, which makes them suitable stretching exercises before the more demanding workout you and I are used to.

Walton, D. (2010). Why Fallacies Appear to be Better Arguments Than They Are. Informal Logic, 30(2). Retrieved August 23, 2010, from http://ojs.uwindsor.ca/ojs/leddy/index.php/informal_logic/article/view/2868/2408

This article puts forward for consideration two fresh concepts, theretofore rather foreign to argumentation theory: one is borrowed from cognitive sciences, heuristics, the other one coined by blending the concept of “argumentation scheme” and that of “paralogism” into parascheme. The point of the latter is to shed some light upon psychological (as opposed to normative) aspects involved in fallacious reasoning and arguing, namely, their occasional handsomeness. I will briefly trace the theoretical aspects, which are fairly straightforward, after which I shall try to account for my skepticism as to the explanatory virtues of such fresh notions.

“Heuristics may be broadly characterized as rules of thumb that enable us to rapidly solve a problem even where information is insufficient to yield an optimal solution” (160). In consequence, the substantive “a heuristic” will refer to a certain “speedy inference” (163) which we, feeble-minded non-robotic humans, embrace either because (a) we do not have other/enough data to assess the chain of reasoning, (b) our cognitive environment is in such a place that it prefers to surmise quickly to a tentative conclusion instead of other time-consuming processes. A parascheme is then “a device that can be used to represent the structure of a heuristic” (id.) For example, the parascheme for argument from expert opinion is:

An expert says A is true, therefore A is true.

So yes, a parascheme is a simpler if not shabbier version of an argumentation scheme having seen better days, i.e. with premises, assumptions and exceptions taken into account[1]. There are important strands to be picked up as regards the relation between an argument scheme and a parascheme (especially if one attempts to model this type of reasoning, see pp. 168-171), but the main question from the title is not directly touched by these considerations. As far as I am able to tell, the simple response is summed up in this paragraph from the end of the article: “a fallacious argument might look better than it really is because it has the basic structure of a parascheme, and therefore looks reasonable because it is a heuristic of the kind we use all the time in everyday reasoning”. (175)

This is, by and large, the theoretical input. Let us try and make a few “translations”. First, let us notice that, in discourse (i.e. the uttered version of any scheme) there is no real difference between a heuristic and a “normal” argument. The fact that “ordinary premises”, “assumptions” and “exceptions” do not appear does not entail that they are not “taken into account”, and within the context of a dialogue, these can be discussed and sorted out. I think Walton definitely acknowledges this when he writes: “In cases where such additional premises are not taken into account […] a fallacy may have been committed” and “the error of jumping to the conclusion too quickly may have been overlooked” (183). The other case, I suppose, is that things are not being overlooked nor disregarded, but simply unexpressed. In other words, if the concept of “parascheme” is used simply as a pragmatic instrument of representation, one would not be able to distinguish it from a scheme. Again, Walton seems to observe this when he writes: “This simplest version [of the scheme] matches the parascheme” (169). But if such little difference exists between a scheme and a parascheme, why keep the latter? The sole dividing line seems to be what one “takes into account” and the other does not: “The parascheme omits one of the prerequisites of the scheme. The fallacy is not one of a false premise, or of a premise that is inadequately supported by evidence. It is one of overlooking a premise that is a prerequisite of the scheme. […] The heuristic takes us by a fast and frugal leap directly to the conclusion.” (170-71)

My comment, squarely put, is this: paraschemes do not omit, work out, simplify or ‘take factors into account’. Their instantiation does. If a parascheme is just a general representation, then speaking of it as “omitting” is at least a metaphor. But if translating the metaphor means changing “the parascheme” into “the utterance of an instance of a parascheme” (and thus doing nothing more than following Walton’s definition), then signaling that such a scheme leaves important stuff (“prerequisites”) behind means judging it out of the context. Within the context of a dialogue/dispute, in fact, what Walton did not yellow (see below) could simply go without saying. It could be purposely left aside or even concealed (which makes it a case of fallaciousness, v. 183), but it could just as well be worked out as the two parties advance in argumentation. For the analyst as for the arguer, the decision of fallaciousness is then alien to any usage or occurrence of a parascheme.

To sum up, my question is this: if the parascheme is identifiable only as an abstract version of a very simple scheme, being undistinguishable in context from, say, an abridged version of a full-fed, shrewdly-considered scheme, how could the concept be capable of explaining the appearance of reasonableness? We can of course choose to name the abridged utterance of a full-fed argumentation scheme a parascheme but that won’t be a step forward explaining the ‘handomeness’ of a possible fallacy. I should like to read more on this subject, but so far, the input from cognitive sciences has not been, as far as my reading has led me, that convincing. 

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[1] Ordinary Premises: E is an expert; E asserts that A; If E is an expert and E asserts that A, then A is true. Assumptions: E is an expert in field F; A is within F; It is assumed to be true that E is a credible expert; It is assumed to be true that what E says is based on evidence in field F.  Exceptions: It is an exception to the generalization stated in the conditional premise if it is found to be false that E is trustworthy; It is an exception to the generalization stated in the conditional premise if it is found to be false that what E asserts is consistent with what other experts in field F say. Conclusion: A is true.

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