The Concept of Mind is one of those books that is often cited by people who haven’t read it but
read about it, and think they know what is in it. They have read that it epitomizes two woefully
regressive schools of thought that flourished unaccountably in mid-century but are now utterly
discredited: Ordinary Language Philosophy and Behaviourism. Yes, and imbibing alcohol will
lead you inexorably to the madhouse and masturbation will make you go blind. Don’t believe it.
— Daniel C. Dennett (2000: xiv)
But ordinary language is all right.
— Ludwig Wittgenstein (1958: 28)
Norton, J. (1996). Are thought experiment just what you thought. Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 26(2), 333-336
Norton attacks the “epistemological problem” of thought experiments (if they give us knowledge about the world, where does this knowledge come from?). The purpose of this paper is to show how thought experiments are epistemologically “unremarkable”. That is to say, they do not constitute some miraculous source of knowledge, but combine rather well-known, “standard”, sources. Thought experiments, according to Norton, blend empirical observations & inference in a rather mundane manner, without affording any special glimpse into a mystifying Platonic world of ideal laws.
Supporting the “empiricist” account of thought experiments – which recognizes only two classic ingredients, namely sense-data & inference – Norton is setting himself against the Platonist account of thought experiments (Jim Brown etc.). According to Norton: “Thought experiments are merely arguments, although this character is typically disguised for rhetorical reasons”. The “disguise”, however, so the reconstruction thesis goes, can be explained away: “All thought experiments can be reconstructed as arguments based on tacit or explicit assumptions. Belief in the outcome-conclusion of the thought experiment is justified only insofar as the reconstructed argument can justify the conclusion”. (The idea that TE’s are arguments may fit very well into a critical-rationalist philosophy, according to which all successful experiments are ultimately arguments, viz. refutations).
The reconstruction of Galileo’s stone-experiment is as follows.
1. Reductio (i.e. the Aristotelian view): The speed of fall of bodies in a given medium is proportionate to their weights.
2. From 1: If a large stone falls with 8 degrees, a smaller stone half its weight will fall with 4 degrees.
3. Assumption: If a slower falling stone is connected to a faster falling stone, the slower will retard the faster and the faster speed the slower.
4. From 3: If two stones of 2 are connected, their composite will fall slower than 8 degrees of speed.
5. Assumption: the composite of two weights has greater weight than the larger
6. From 1 & 5: The composite will fall faster than 8 degrees
7. Conclusions 4 & 6 contradict
8. Therefore we must reject assumption 1
9. Therefore all stones fall alike.
The only two problems with this reconstruction are: (1) this is not a reconstruction of an argument, (2) this is not – or not immediately apparently – valid. As regards 1: Unless by “argument” Norton means “whatever happens between 1 and 9 and lends 9 certain degree of justification”, then what one should see are several arguments. This, I think, is all the more evident since there is not just one major assumption (1) but at leas three (1, 3 & 5). As regards 2: I don’t know what type of logic Norton alludes to but, at least stated in this way, the argumentation just sounds nice, and that informally.
Newton’s bucket argument (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bucket_argument) and some mathematical thought experiments are discussed in the same vein. They all seem to fit, however one chooses to view their components. The definition of “argument” both authors seem to endorse is wholly absent. Everything, from mental operations to algebra is spoken about as arguments. Of course, it could be the case that, in the author’s own words “finally, a straightforward application of Occam’s razor speaks for the argument view”, but the question cannot be settled if the term “argument” is left in the murky zone of “oh, you know what I mean”.
The paper ends with a section on whether the analogy between the empirical perception of objects and Platonic perception of laws is viable…
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