Some rhetorical aspects of thought experiments

In this paper, “J. J. Thomson’s Violonist” is repeatedly mentioned. It refers to this: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Violinist_(thought_experiment)

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Souder, L. (2003). What are we to think about thought experiments?. Argumentation, 17(2), 203-217.

“A rhetorical analysis of thought experiments? Right on!” That is what I thought when I read Souder’s abstract

Arguments from thought experiment ask the reader to imagine some hypothetical, sometimes exotic, often fantastic, scenario for the sake of illustrating or countering some claim. Variously characterized as mental experimentation, imaginary cases, and even crazy cases, thought experiments figure into both scientific and philosophical arguments. They are often criticized for their fictive nature and for their lack of grounding. Nevertheless, they are common especially in arguments in ethics and philosophy of mind. Moreover, many thought experiments have spawned variations that attempt to both affirm and refute their original arguments. These emended thought experiments exhibit a variety of styles, details, and embellishments. A rhetorical analysis of these variations suggests a reciprocal influence between the arguers’ selection of details and their philosophical commitments. I offer examples of this relationship from the variations on John Searle’s Chinese Room thought experiment and Judith Thomson’s unconscious violinist thought experiment.

Starting from Judith Thomson’s Famous Violonist thought experminet, and generalizing, Souder comments: “it has certain characteristics and expectations that enable it to engage the readers and encourage them to actively participate in the issue and not just passively observe. Fictional examples that engage the audience in this way are known as thought experiments” (p. 204).

Sorensen is quoted: “Sorensen says, ‘A thought experiment is an experiment that

purports to achieve its aim without the benefit of execution’” (p. 205). The impossibility of their execution has been characterized as “merely technical” – still, a downright impossibility, which is different from a mere difficulty. Does that matter?

It is noted that thought experiments can go from four pages (R. M. Hare’s If man could menstruate) to one-liners such as Xenphanes’ “If god had not made yellow honey, men would consider figs far sweeter” (see Rescher, 1991 for the latter). And that they can ‘survive’ in many forms while being shifted back and forth from philosopher to philosopher. Perelman’s (!) notion of analogy is quoted as being apt to describe this process.

Souder is interested in how the characters, the author of the experiment and the scenario itself are “represented” and what sort of influence this has on the function of the experiment altogether. The claims made, however, are quite “light” and vague: “In thought experiments (all?), it seems (?), the reader is never far away from the author’s awareness” or “During the author’s account of his own introspection, the reader is expected to replicate the author’s line of thinking and to arrive at the same conclusions. In short, the author’s ‘I’ becomes the reader’s ‘I’.” or “So by keeping the account of

the Chinese room in the first person, Searle keeps the subjective aspect of the mental implicit and thereby encourages the reader to do likewise by running the simulation in his own mind.”(p. 210) A very metaphorical (thus, opaque) rhetorical analysis. (becomes, encourages etc.). Eventually, the reason for using this or that pronoun for the main character of the Chinese room – the person locked inside – is put forward.

Short discussion about intentionality…

The reason is this: “This condition forces one to choose between the two mutually exclusive positions: (1) I’m the only conscious being in the universe and (2) All beings in the universe are conscious. In either case no one’s report suffices for proof of consciousness. Thus most functionalists avoid first-person accounts of the Chinese room thought experiment.” (p. 213)

The next analysis deals with Thomson’s unconscious violonist. Again, things start seeming. “Their contrasting modes of description [of the violonist] seem to reflect their regard for the beneficiary and the victim. Thomson’s argument presupposes greater concern for the victim than for the beneficiary; for this she portrays the former in concrete terms, the latter in abstract.” (p. 215)

I regret that the only paper on thought experiments from Argumentation is a paper consisting mainly of, to be frank, feeble conjectures about the connection between pronouns and rhetorical aims. There is an Informal Logic number dedicated to Sorensen’s Thought experiments, I hope to get more from there.