Comparing the incomparable

Garssen, B. (2009). Comparing the incomparable: Figurative analogies in a dialectical testing procedure. In F. H. van Eemeren & B. Garssen, Pondering on problems of argumentation: Twenty essays on theoretical issues (pp. 133-140). Amsterdam: Springer

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A short paper on analogies. The question Garssen attempts to answer is this: Is analogy a type of comparison? The answer is: no. Let’s see.

Comparison argumentation stands in the pragma-dialectical theory as one of the three types of argument schemes alongside symptomatic and causal argumentation. In general, what makes pragma-dialecticians distinguish one scheme from another is the different type of “liaison” they provide from the premise to the standpoint. Regardless of their form in natural language, the reconstructed versions of these schemes are seen as different because they elicit separate critical behaviour. More precisely, you cannot use the critical questions that go with one scheme to test the other.

Comparison argumentation goes as follows. (Notice that X & Y below can be any referable object under discussion – these are not grammatical representations).

Y is true of X

because: Y is true of Z

and: Z is comparable to X.

One variant of this scheme is called by Garssen the “extrapolation of characteristics”. His example is this:

Camera surveillance in the centre of Amsterdam will prove to be very effective, because in London, camera surveillance proved to be highly effective before.

If we twist the language a bit, we get to:

The effectiveness of surveillance is true of Amsterdam

because The effectiveness of surveillance is true of London

and London is comparable to Amsterdam.

Notice, also, that this is not a logical reconstruction. This “scheme” does not have any merits on its own, but stands as a reasonable argumentation for the standpoint if the critical questions pertaining to it are satisfactorily answered. And this is a matter of degree.

Another type of comparison scheme could be identified with respect to prescriptive standpoints. (Notice that in the example above Garssen dealt with descriptive statements – i.e. which do not have modal aspect).

His example of this second variant is this:

The European committee should grand Belgium higher agricultural subsidies because it granted Italy higher subsidies as well.

This could be reconstructed in the same manner, but notice the extra sauce: the question of the adequacy of such argument hinges on whether the two (Belgium & Italy in our case) are indeed members of the same class. In legal contexts, this boils down to checking the legal provisions. However, in one way or another, the adequacy of the scheme depends on the acceptability of the answer to the critical question: Are they indeed members of the same class?

But now what about figurative analogies?

At first glance, they seem way off the track. (Conversationally too!)

Take this one. Answering to whether USA should intervene in Korea, president Truman is said to have asked:

The best time to meet the threat is in the beginning. It is easier to put out a fire in the beginning when it is small than after it has become a roaring blaze.

Here’s Garssen’s commentary:

Fire and war clearly belong to different classes of events. That makes it impossible to compare them in a direct way. In this case we have to look for similarities, not so much between the concrete features of fire and war, but between the abstract relations within what is said in the premise and what is said in the standpoint. It I predicted that the war in Korea will become unmanageable if we do not act immediately and that is exactly the reason why we should act now. Truman does not make a direct, literal, comparison between war and fire. That is why the standard critical questions that go with comparison argumentation (are there similarities? are there differences?) do not really apply.

The reason why this path was chosen: if we really set about to test this argument in the way normal comparison schemes would require, it wouldn’t stand a chance. Fire is unlike war in every direct (read: literal) sense. However, more intuitively, fire and war are alike on a more abstract level – they are alike in a sense, as the cautious philosopher would say. Therefore, one should reveal this in his or her reconstruction.

According to Garssen we could explain this intuition as follows: “figurative analogy is not argumentation based on a comparison relation but a way of presenting another type of argument scheme” (138). In other words, it is not that it is a looser, more far-fetched, type of comparison; it is a discursive device for introducing (and supporting) a sub-standpoint. Notice, again, the structure in the Truman example:

The best time to meet the threat is in the beginning. It is easier to put out a fire in the beginning when it is small than after it has become a roaring blaze.

So,

We should go to war against Korea now/ We should not postpone our response to the war that is now developing in Korea. That is because the best time to meet the threat is in the beginning. It is like being confronted with a fire. It is easier to put it out in the beginning when it is small then after it has become a roaring blaze.

Garssen does not reconstruct this example. In fact, he doesn’t provide a full reconstruction of any of the examples. Let us try:

(1.) What happens in Korea (Y) is such that our response to it should not be delayed (X)

(1.1.) What happens in Korea (Y) is a threat (Z).

(1.1’) Threats (Z) are such that one’s response to them should not be delayed (X).

Notice that this is a case of symptomatic argumentation.

Where does our fire-analogy fit? Garssen’s answer seems to be: “Nowhere”. Because the fire-war figurative language is not part of the reconstructed argumentation. It is just a way of introducing an agreed upon starting point, namely (1.1’). So what the party really needs for his argumentation is this statement (1.1’), and the way he introduces it is by referring to a more well-known situation – or a more easily imaginable one – namely that when a fire threatens to become “a roaring blaze”. So what we have here is a case where the protagonist is urging the other party to recognize the principle (1.1’) as recognized in other, simpler, instances.